Landmark UK Conviction: Aviation Salesman and Financier Guilty of Arms Deals Tied to Proliferation Financing Risks

A British aviation salesman and a Greek financier have been convicted of selling tanks, fighter jets, missiles, assault rifles and other military goods to embargoed countries including Iran, South Sudan and Syria.

This is one of the most significant UK prosecutions in recent years for breaches of strategic export controls involving arms brokering to multiple embargoed destinations.

While this was an export-control prosecution, it is a textbook illustration of proliferation-financing risk in practice — particularly given the involvement of Iran and the sophisticated evasion techniques employed.

Key facts

• David Greenhalgh, 68, of Croydon in south London, and Christos Farmakis, 48, a Greek national, were found guilty yesterday (11 June 2026) at Southwark Crown Court of multiple counts of illegal international arms brokering.
• Greenhalgh, the owner and controlling director of the "Airservices" group of companies (registered in the UK, Greece, North Macedonia, Hong Kong and South Sudan), was convicted on 10 counts.
• Intended destinations included Sudan, South Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Iran and Syria — all subject to UK arms embargoes at the time. Some deals ran into tens of millions of dollars.
• Farmakis, who ran negotiations through a Cyprus-registered company called Black Betty Consulting while working as a London-based business adviser, was convicted on 9 counts.
• Both were found guilty under the Export Control Order 2008 of being knowingly concerned in acts calculated to promote the unlicensed supply or delivery of controlled military goods to embargoed destinations.
• The Export Control Joint Unit confirmed that no licence applications were ever made in connection with the alleged deals.
• The nine-week trial heard that between July 2009 and December 2016 the pair acted as middlemen, sourcing ageing stockpiles of weapons from former Soviet and Eastern European states (including Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia and the Czech Republic) and attempting to channel them into conflict zones and sanctioned countries.
• Greenhalgh and Farmakis will be sentenced on 22 July 2026 at Southwark Crown Court.

The military goods involved included:

• Surface-to-air missile systems (such as Pechora S-125) capable of downing aircraft
• Fighter jets (MiG-29, Su-25, Su-27)
• Mi-24 combat helicopter gunships and associated weapons
• Battle tanks and spare parts
• Anti-tank missile launchers and rocket-propelled grenades
• Thousands of AK-47 assault rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition

Forged Documents

• Prosecutors said the men used forged end-user certificates, false shipping documents and routed deliveries through third countries to conceal the true destinations.
• Emails recovered during the investigation showed both men discussing how to evade UK licensing controls.
• Farmakis wrote: "Any activity without an EUC is illegal and subject to criminal investigations."
• Greenhalgh, discussing a proposed deal for 100,000 AK-47 rifles to South Sudan, noted that "Iraq/Syria is hoovering up every piece of small arms in market" and warned that "Europe WILL NOT accept your paperwork."
• Farmakis was tried in his absence and is believed to be in Greece; UK authorities are working with international partners to bring him to the UK to face sentencing. Greenhalgh remains in the UK.

Anja Hohmeyer, Specialist Prosecutor at the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), said:

• "Greenhalgh and Farmakis treated the international arms trade as their personal business opportunity – systematically sourcing weapons from former Soviet states and attempting to channel them into some of the world's most dangerous conflict zones, including Libya and South Sudan.
• They knew exactly what they were doing…
• This conviction sends a clear message: UK arms trafficking and brokering laws apply to anyone subject to this jurisdiction, wherever in the world they try to conduct their business. The CPS will not hesitate to prosecute those who seek to profit from conflict."

Edwige Hill, Deputy Director in HMRC's Fraud Investigation Service, said:

• "Greenhalgh and Farmakis showed a blatant disregard for international sanctions, seeking to profit from the illegal supply of weapons.
• These convictions are a clear warning to others that you will face justice for breaching the UK's strict controls and brokering illegal supplies to sanctioned and embargoed destinations."

Why This Case Raises Proliferation Financing Risks

1. High-risk destinations, especially Iran

• Iran is one of the highest-risk jurisdictions globally for proliferation financing due to its nuclear programme, ballistic missile development, and extensive sanctions regime.
• Supplying (or attempting to supply) fighter jets, surface-to-air missiles, tanks, and other military equipment to Iran and other embargoed states (Syria, Sudan/South Sudan) can contribute to the military capabilities of proliferation-concern countries.
• UK export controls explicitly exist to
• Prevent both WMD proliferation and
• Conventional arms flows to embargoed destinations that could fuel conflict or support sanctioned regimes.

2. Classic proliferation financing and sanctions-evasion typologies: The pair's methods match well-known PF red flags:

• Use of complex, multi-jurisdictional corporate structures (UK, Greece, North Macedonia, Hong Kong, South Sudan, Cyprus) to obscure ownership and control.
• Forged end-user certificates and false shipping documents.
• Routing deals through third countries.
• Emails showing clear knowledge that the activity was illegal and deliberate attempts to evade UK licensing.
• Acting as brokers/middlemen sourcing from former Soviet states for high-risk end users.

These are textbook indicators of trade-based money laundering, sanctions evasion, and proliferation financing.

3. Regulatory and compliance connection

• UK export controls (including the Export Control Order 2008) are a key tool in the UK's counter-proliferation financing framework.
• They cover military goods,
• Dual-use items, and military end-use in embargoed countries —
• Precisely to stop items reaching WMD programmes or sanctioned actors.
• Financial institutions have obligations under the UK's Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, Money Laundering Regulations, and FATF standards to identify and mitigate proliferation financing risks.
• Sectors exposed in this case (aviation sales, international trade finance, company formation, business advisory services) are flagged in UK and FATF guidance as higher risk for PF.

4. Not charged as "proliferation financing" per se — but still highly relevant.

• The defendants were not prosecuted under specific PF or terrorism-financing offences.
• However, the underlying activity (illegal arms brokering to Iran and other sanctioned states using deceptive financial and trade practices) is exactly the type of conduct that triggers proliferation financing risk assessments in banks, insurers, and professional services firms.

Practical Implications

This case serves as a real-world example for compliance teams:

• Heightened scrutiny is required for clients in aviation, defence-related trade, or with links to Iran, Syria, Sudan/South Sudan, or similar jurisdictions.
• Red flags include complex offshore structures, reluctance to provide clear end-use information, and deals involving former Soviet military equipment.
• Banks and DNFBPs (lawyers, accountants, company service providers) should incorporate PF risk into their enterprise-wide risk assessments, especially for trade finance and correspondent banking.

Sources for verification (all publicly available as of 12 June 2026):

1. Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) – Official Press Release (most detailed official account) https://www.cps.gov.uk/cps/news/two-men-convicted-illegal-international-arms-trafficking-landmark-uk-prosecution
2. HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) – Official Press Release (investigation details, quotes, background on concealment methods) https://www.mynewsdesk.com/uk/hm-revenue-customs-hmrc/pressreleases/arms-dealer-guilty-of-illegal-weapons-deals-3453737
3. BBC News – Journalistic summary (clear overview with context) https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly8vjvzrnjo
4. Global Investigations Review (source of the exact wording you provided) https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/just-sanctions/article/businessmen-convicted-in-uk-weapons-sales-iran-others
5. Reuters – Earlier trial coverage (background on the charges and proceedings) https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/two-arms-brokers-trial-uk-missiles-fighter-jet-deals-with-libya-sudan-2026-04-14/

PROLIFERATION FINANCING

1. FATF guidance on proliferation financing (typologies reports)

Main official sources:

• FATF Typologies Report on Proliferation Financing (2008) – Classic detailed report on how proliferators exploit trade, brokers, front companies, and financial systems. Direct PDF: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Typologies%20Report%20on%20Proliferation%20Financing.pdf
• FATF Guidance on Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment and Mitigation (2021) – Current key guidance for countries, banks and DNFBPs on identifying and mitigating PF risks. Page: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Financingofproliferation/Proliferation-financing-risk-assessment-mitigation.html
• FATF Guidance on Counter Proliferation Financing (2018) – Focuses on implementation of UNSCRs and preventing sanctions evasion in proliferation cases. Page: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Financingofproliferation/Guidance-counter-proliferation-financing.html
• Recent FATF Report: Complex Proliferation Financing & Sanctions Evasion Schemes (2025) – Highlights typologies including use of intermediaries and obscuring beneficial ownership (very relevant to the UK case). Page: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Financingofproliferation/complex-proliferation-financing-sanction-evasion-schemes.html

2. UK Export Control Order 2008 and HMRC/CPS materials on this case

Legislation (primary legal basis):

• The Export Control Order 2008 (full consolidated text) – The exact law under which Greenhalgh and Farmakis were convicted. Covers brokering, military goods, end-use controls, and embargoed destinations. Direct link: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/3231/contents

This specific case (HMRC & CPS official press releases – best for quotes and facts):

• Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) – 11 June 2026 https://www.cps.gov.uk/cps/news/two-men-convicted-illegal-international-arms-trafficking-landmark-uk-prosecution
• HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) – 11 June 2026 https://www.mynewsdesk.com/uk/hm-revenue-customs-hmrc/pressreleases/arms-dealer-guilty-of-illegal-weapons-deals-3453737

3. UK government guidance on export controls and sanctions (explicitly links to WMD proliferation and arms embargoes)

Core gov.uk pages (ready to copy from):

• Export controls: dual-use items, software and technology... – Main practical guidance. Explicitly covers WMD end-use controls, military end-use in embargoed countries, and links to sanctions. Direct link: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/export-controls-dual-use-items-software-and-technology-goods-for-torture-and-radioactive-sources
• UK strategic export controls – Overview explaining that export controls prevent contribution to WMD proliferation and destabilising accumulation of conventional weapons. Direct link: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-strategic-export-controls
• End-use controls applying to WMD-related items – Detailed guidance on WMD end-use controls. Direct link: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/end-use-controls-applying-to-wmd-related-items-including-technical-help
• International non-proliferation and arms control regimes – Explains how UK controls implement international obligations on WMD and arms embargoes. Direct link: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/international-non-proliferation-and-arms-control-regimes