Proliferation financing (PF) & weapons of mass destruction (WMD) risks associated with specific countries.

RUSI discusses proliferation financing (PF) risks associated with specific countries and trends in illicit procurement related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

• https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/guide-conducting-national-proliferation-financing-risk-assessment-2024

Here are some insights based on the discussions in the document – reference numbers are provided:

• North Korea:
• North Korea has a history of seeking proliferation-sensitive goods and technologies for its nuclear, missile, chemical, and biological weapons programs.
• It has been known to exploit virtual asset service providers to generate revenue for its WMD programs 7.
• The country relies on global procurement networks and has used diplomatic missions to facilitate procurement and generate revenue [[9], [30]].
• Iran:
• Iran's procurement networks utilise overseas intermediaries, including the Iranian diaspora. The country has pursued dual-use goods and technologies for its ballistic missile and UAV programs 11.
• Following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran has continued to seek technologies for its nuclear and missile programs, including high-end pressure sensors and other sensitive materials 12.
• Russia:
• Russia has been involved in the procurement of dual-use technologies for its nuclear and missile programs. Recent reports indicate the use of Western components in missile production 14.
• The country has also been implicated in supplying ballistic missiles to North Korea 14.
• China:
• China has engaged in illicit procurement activities for its WMD programs, with reports highlighting its use of Western-origin machine tools 14.
• Pakistan:
• Pakistan has a history of illicit procurement related to its nuclear program, utilizing global networks to acquire necessary technologies 14.
• Syria:
• Although Syria does not have an active nuclear program, it engages in illicit procurement for its missile and chemical weapons programs, having collaborated with North Korea for technology 14.

Conclusion

• The document emphasises that global WMD proliferation activities extend beyond these countries and involve a complex web of procurement networks.
• Each country's risk profile is influenced by its procurement strategies, historical activities, and the geopolitical context in which it operates.

For a detailed risk assessment, jurisdictions should follow the frameworks and guidelines provided in the document, focusing on specific threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences related to PF within their national contexts 33.

SOURCE

• https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/guide-conducting-national-proliferation-financing-risk-assessment-2024