The US-FED REPORT on $7 billion Crypto ML Tumbler - Tornado Cash
15/08/2024
OFAC designated Tornado Cash in August 2022, accusing the company of laundering “more than $7 billion worth of virtual currency since its creation”.
The Federal Reserve Bank has published a report on the impact of US sanctions on “cryptocurrency tumbler” Tornado Cash.
The report:-
- Uses Tornado Cash as a case study to explore whether sanctions can regulate decentralised systems.
- Found that Tornado Cash transactions initially dropped after the announcement of sanctions. However, transaction levels in some smaller Tornado Cash “pools” have now returned to pre-sanction levels.
- Theorised that “pecuniary motives or operational constraints do not drive non-cooperation [with sanctions], and instead by philosophical reasons".
LONG READ
Today, August 8, 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned virtual currency mixer Tornado Cash, which has been used to launder more than $7 billion since its creation in 2019.
This includes over $455 million stolen by the Lazarus Group, a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) state-sponsored hacking group that was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2019, in the largest known virtual currency heist to date.
Tornado Cash was subsequently used to launder
- More than $96 million of malicious cyber actors’ funds derived from the June 24, 2022 Harmony Bridge Heist and
- At least $7.8 million from the August 2, 2022, Nomad Heist.
Today’s action is being taken according to Executive Order (E.O.) 13694, as amended, and follows virtual currency mixer Blender.io (Blender) designation.
“Today, Treasury is sanctioning Tornado Cash, a virtual currency mixer that launders the proceeds of cybercrimes, including those committed against victims in the United States,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson.
- “Despite public assurances otherwise, Tornado Cash has repeatedly failed to impose effective controls designed to stop it from regularly laundering funds for malicious cyber actors without basic measures to address its risks. Treasury will continue aggressively pursuing actions against mixers that launder virtual currency for criminals and those who assist them.”
Treasury has worked to expose components of the virtual currency ecosystem, like Tornado Cash and Blender.io, that cybercriminals use to obfuscate the proceeds from illicit cyber activity and other crimes. While most virtual currency activity is licit, it can be used for illicit activity, including sanctions evasion through mixers, peer-to-peer exchangers, darknet markets, and exchanges. This includes the facilitation of heists, ransomware schemes, fraud, and other cybercrimes.
Treasury continues to use its authorities against malicious cyber actors in concert with other U.S. departments and agencies and foreign partners to expose, disrupt, and hold accountable perpetrators and persons that enable criminals to profit from cybercrime and other illicit activity.
- For example, in 2020, the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) assessed a $60 million civil money penalty against the owner and operator of a virtual currency mixer for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and its implementing regulations.
- https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_action/2020-10-19/HarmonHelix Assessment and SoF_508_101920.pdf
MIXER: TORNADO CASH
Tornado Cash (Tornado) is a virtual currency mixer that operates on the Ethereum blockchain and indiscriminately facilitates anonymous transactions by obfuscating their origin, destination, and counterparties, with no attempt to determine their origin.
Tornado receives a variety of transactions and mixes them together before transmitting them to their individual recipients. While the purported purpose is to increase privacy, mixers like Tornado are commonly used by illicit actors to launder funds, especially those stolen during significant heists.
Tornado is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13694, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, a cyber-enabled activity originating from, or directed by persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States that is reasonably likely to result in, or has materially contributed to, a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States and that has the purpose or effect of causing a significant misappropriation of funds or economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain.
ILLICIT FINANCE RISKS
Virtual currency mixers that assist criminals are a threat to U.S. national security. Treasury will continue to investigate the use of mixers for illicit purposes and use its authorities to respond to illicit financing risks in the virtual currency ecosystem
Criminals have increased their use of anonymity-enhancing technologies, including mixers, to help hide the movement or origin of funds. Additional information on illicit financing risks associated with mixers and other anonymity-enhancing technologies in the virtual asset ecosystem can be found in the 2022 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment.
Those in the virtual currency industry play a critical role in complying with their Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) and sanctions obligations to prevent sanctioned persons and other illicit actors from exploiting virtual currency to undermine U.S foreign policy and national security interests. As part of that effort, the industry should take a risk-based approach to assess the risk associated with different virtual currency services, implement measures to mitigate risks, and address the challenges anonymizing features can present to compliance with AML/CFT obligations.
As today’s action demonstrates, mixers should in general be considered as high-risk by virtual currency firms, which should only process transactions if they have appropriate controls in place to prevent mixers from being used to launder illicit proceeds.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the entity above, Tornado Cash, that is in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, is blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 per cent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.
All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorised by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt.
These prohibitions include making or providing funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and receiving such funds, goods, or services from any such person.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List and its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish but to bring about a positive behaviour change. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to
OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897 here. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/897
For detailed information on the process of submitting a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, click here. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/specially-designated-nationals-list-sdn-list/filing-a-petition-for-removal-from-an-ofac-list
To identify information on the entity sanctioned today, as well as associated virtual wallet addresses, click here. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220808
To report a cybercrime, contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center here. https://www.ic3.gov/Home/ComplaintChoice
For the U.S. government’s 2020 DPRK Cyber Threat Advisory, click here. https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/2020-04/DPRK_Cyber_Threat_Advisory_04152020_S508C.pdf
For information on complying with virtual currency sanctions, see OFAC’s Sanctions Compliance Guidance for the Virtual Currency Industry here and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/virtual_currency_guidance_brochure.pdf
OFAC’s FAQs on virtual currency here. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/topic/1626
SOURCE
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